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Does the Non-Aligned Movement Still Matter?

In Africa, Anticolonialism, Asia, Cultural Bridges, Current Events, Middle East & North Africa, United Nations, World Law on August 27, 2012 at 11:36 AM

DOES THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT STILL MATTER?

by René Wadlow

With Iran taking over the three-year term of the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (N.A.M.) at the end of August 2012, the question arises: Does the Non-Aligned Movement still matters in world politics and how will Iran use the presidency?

At the time of its founding at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, the major world powers were aligned in Soviet- and United States-led blocs. The war in Korea had recently ended in an armistice with the same frontiers as at the start but could have been the forerunner of a world war. The French war in Indochina had ended with independence of the three Indochina states, but a new independence conflict had just started in Algeria. Basically Bandung marked the end of formal colonialism. As Sir John Kotelawala, Premier of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), said at the end of the conference “Bandung will be a name to reverberate in history and earn the gratitude and blessings of ages to come.”

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India delivering the closing speech at the Bandung Conference that created the Non-Aligned Movement.

For fear that the new Non-Aligned movement might supplement or weaken the United Nations (UN), no implementary organization was set up. Later, the pattern of three-year rotating presidency was developed, but without a permanent secretariat. The country holding the presidency offers its own diplomats and civil servants to carry on Non-Aligned tasks. The outgoing presidency — Egypt — was so taken up with its own political changes that it virtually played no role on behalf of the N.A.M. Will Iran be able to do more than use the prestige of the Movement to defend its own interests?

In time, the Non-Aligned Movement grew up to become a major player in international relations, providing the Third World with a voice of its own on the world stage.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will become the N.A.M. representative for its 118 members. His first presentation will be to the UN General Assembly in September. His talk should be analyzed closely to see if his presentation goes beyond the usual Iranian positions to be more inclusive of the interests of the N.A.M. members. A large conference at the end of August in Tehran will be the formal start of Iran’s presidency. Some Iranian leaders have called for the creation of a permanent secretariat. Thus it will be important to note what structural reforms are made within the N.A.M.

While in 1955, the idea of a “third camp” was a possibility — a wedge of sanity and restraint between the two atomic giants —, now there are real conflicts of interest among the N.A.M. members — the conflict in Syria being a prime example, along with differing territorial claims within the South China Sea among China and its neighbors.

The direct threats issued against the State of Israel by Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, albeit in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s own warmongering rhetoric against Iran, raises serious questions as to what Ahmadinejad can be expected to make of his presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Iran itself is at the center of an international storm, and it is not clear if its diplomats and political leaders will have the energy to deal with the host of current conflicts among N.A.M. states as well as making proposition concerning the important economic, financial and ecological issues that the world faces. Moreover, the N.A.M. states are members of regional, intergovernmental organizations and therefore look less to N.A.M. leadership to structure economic and cultural cooperation.

Yet the N.A.M. does provide a structure for states and a large percentage of the people of the world. N.A.M. leadership has had an erratic relation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) — sometimes encouraging their participation in meetings and programs and at other times ignoring them completely. Without a permanent secretariat, the N.A.M. has not developed the sort of consultative status that the UN has with NGOs. The Indian government at one stage had encouraged NGO-related activities within the N.A.M. Given the challenges facing the Iranian presidency of the N.A.M. it would be useful for NGOs to propose a more structured and formal relation with the N.A.M. especially if a permanent secretariat is created.

René Wadlow is President and Chief Representative to the United Nations, Geneva, of the Association of World Citizens.

Supporting Young Syrians who Say “Stop the Killing!”

In Conflict Resolution, Current Events, Human Rights, Middle East & North Africa, Solidarity, The Search for Peace, United Nations, World Law on May 26, 2012 at 3:07 PM

SUPPORTING YOUNG SYRIANS WHO SAY “STOP THE KILLING!”

By René Wadlow

 Image

In early May 2012, there were particularly deadly explosions in Damascus, the capital of Syria, an escalation of a conflict which began over a year ago with nonviolent protests but which spilled over into violence, refugee displacements, and ever deeper division among the people of Syria.

For the moment, the efforts of the League of Arab States and the United Nations have not been able to establish good-faith negotiations or even a permanent ceasefire. Therefore a group of young nonviolent Syrians have created a movement “Stop the Killing,” not related to a political party or a confessional religious group, but which wishes to unite those of good will to stop the violence and to develop a society in which all can contribute.

Therefore, we who are outside Syria, send our support and willingness to cooperate.

I believe in you, and I believe in your destiny.

I believe that you have inherited from your forefathers an ancient dream, a song, a prophecy which you can proudly lay as a gift of gratitude to  those working for a just resolution of the current conflicts.

I believe that it is in you to be good citizens.

And what is it to be a good citizen?

It is to acknowledge the other person’s rights before asserting your own, but always to be conscious of your own.

It is to be free in word and deed but it is to know that your freedom is subject to the other person’s freedom.

It is to know that killing will never bring a society of justice and harmony. A just and nonviolent society is the fruit of wisdom and love. Therefore let love, human and frail, command the coming day.

 

 

Rene Wadlow, a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and of its Task Force on the Middle East, is President and Chief Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva of the Association of World Citizens.

World Citizens Call for Renewed Efforts for a Mali Federation

In Africa, Conflict Resolution, Current Events, The Search for Peace, United Nations, World Law on April 29, 2012 at 10:10 PM

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE

TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF WORLD CITIZENS

WORLD CITIZENS CALL FOR RENEWED EFFORTS

FOR A MALI FEDERATION

       

In an April 29, 2012 message to H. E. Mr. Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, Prof. René Wadlow, President of the Association of World Citizens, called upon the African Union to facilitate the creation of a federation of north and south Mali rather than having the country split into two independent states with unresolved frontier issues.

President Wadlow highlighted the recent meeting of representatives of the 15-member Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) on April 26-27 in Abidjan which set a 12-month deadline for a transition period in Mali after the March 22coup of military officers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo. In response to strong, negative reactions by the international community, on April 7 there was a return to a civilian transitional government. However, the northern half of the country is now controlled by two rival Tuareg groups, the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and the Ansar Dine. The MNLA has declared the northern half to be the independent state of Azawad.

“12 months should be long enough to work out a new constitution which maintains the unity of the country while at the same time providing the needed autonomy to the north and a preservation of the Tuareg way of life.” World Citizens believe in cooperation and in finding solutions based on respect for the positions and values of all the parties in the conflict.

“The Association of World Citizens believes that the Commission for Peace and Security of the African Union is well placed to help in drafting such a new federal constitution, especially as the Commissioner is a former Ambassador of Algeria to the United Nations. In the past, Algeria has played a mediation role between the Tuareg who also inhabit south Algeria and the governments of Mali and Niger where there are larger Tuareg communities.”

The declaration of the independence of north Mali by the MNLA is the first time such a formal proclamation has been made, although the independence of Azawad has always been among the Tuareg demands. Thus, it may be difficult for the Tuareg leadership, now in a position of force, to return simply to promises of greater autonomy within a unified Mali. A federation with clear divisions of authority could be a measure acceptable to both the MNLA and the government in Bamako.

“A crisis is a time for creative efforts. The Association of World Citizens is prepared to be of help with expertise in federal-confederal forms of government in this process.

“A transition period of 12 months may seem like a long time, but given the deep divisions of attitudes among leaders of north and south Mali, the sooner such efforts get underway the better. Support for the goal of a Mali federation on the part of the African Union’s Commission for Peace and Security could be an important part of creating a positive atmosphere in which such constitution drafting could be carried out.”

–   30   –

A New Mali Federation?

In Africa, Anticolonialism, Conflict Resolution, Current Events, The Search for Peace, United Nations, World Law on April 21, 2012 at 9:55 PM

A NEW MALI FEDERATION?

By René Wadlow

 

Since the fall of northern Mali to the forces of the Tuareg at the end of March 2012, the situation has grown in complexity. The group of young officers, more or less led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, had taken control of the government buildings of the Central Government in Bamako on March 23, but they had little idea of what else to do.

There was an immediate counter-reaction on the part of Western States such as France and the USA who provide most of the financial and technical assistance to Mali. Both France and the USA cut their aid to Mali—a country currently facing a severe drought and food shortages.  Likewise, the 15 states of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) called for a speedy return to the civilian government. Captain Sanogo saw the “handwriting on the wall” and agreed to turn over the government to the President of the National Assembly who is the constitutional replacement when the President is absent.

In the meantime, the country is divided into two roughly equal areas—a north with the Tuareg holding the two major cities of Timbuktu and Gao, and the more populated south whose population provides most of the civil service, the army and the agricultural wealth of the country.

The Tuareg along with various armed groups probably from Mauritania, south Algeria and fighters who had been recruited for Libya are divided on what strategy to follow. There are two broad options. The largest group, Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) wants an independent state of northern Mali (and probably part of the Tuareg-inhabited Niger) to be called Azawad. The second faction, called Ansar Dine, is smaller but is more heavily armed and contains the bulk of armed foreigners. Their stated aim is to take control of all of Mali and to install Islamic law.

Tuareg rebels near the Sahara desert

Both options have difficulties. Northern Mali as an independent state of Azawad has no natural resources, a small population and few educated people to administer a state or to develop any economy beyond that of camel nomadism. In addition, most African states are opposed to carving up existing states or changing frontiers—a Pandora’s box as many states could be redrawn on ethnic lines and frontiers changed. Thus “territorial integrity” is an article of faith.

Ansar Dine’s option of an Islamist Mali is also difficult to realize. The Bambara and the Malinké are the largest groups in the country and hold economic, military, and political power. Ideologically, they are opposed to the Islamic vision of Ansar Dine, being more Sufi-influenced with a large measure of traditional African beliefs and practices mixed in.(1) Thus the possibility of Ansar Dine gaining support in the south of Mali is slight.  However, they may be able with force of arms to impose their views on Timbuktu and Gao but not on the northern countryside.  The Tuareg are not Islamist by tradition.  Yet in the two cities, the Ansar Dine may be able to force women to cover their hair, prevent the sale of wine and cut the hands of robbers—these three practices being the extent of their knowledge of Islamic law.

Faced with the difficulties of having a northern Malian state—Azawad—accepted by the power-holders of Mali and the neighboring states, there have been some discussions among Tuareg leaders and a former Malian government leader in Nouahchott, Mauritania. There have been no official statements coming from these talks, in part because both north and south Mali are in administrative disorder.  No one knows how much authority the persons involved have.  For the moment, it is probably at best “Track II” diplomacy, trying to see what are the aspirations, the limits of the acceptable, and the degree of the willingness to compromise. In the past France and Algeria have mediated disputes between the Tuareg and the central government of Mali. There have been past agreements on autonomy for the Tuareg.  However, these agreements have rarely held and more centralized government was slowly restored. I believe that this is due more to the incapacity of the Tuareg to provide trained people to run a decentralized administration than ill will or a desire of control on the part of the central government.

Yet, in the past, a “declaration of independence” for northern Mali was never proclaimed. Now that a powerful segment has declared the independence of Azawad, can they go “backward” and accept greater autonomy within a unified Mali?

Echoes from the current Nouachott talks have spoken of a “Federation of Mali”. The name has already been used. The Mali Federation with Senegal was achieved briefly on the eve of independence and lasted for 506 days from April 1, 1959 until August 19, 1960 when it fell apart during the conflict between the President of Senegal, L. S. Senghor and his Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, largely over the division of authority between the two posts.

Because of the way these events occurred, Mali was deprived of its principle outlet to the sea —Dakar, for three years.  Attempts to revive federalism between Mali, Guinea, and Ghana, two other states which had also chosen an anti-colonial “socialist” policy, proved futile.(2) Mali, which had been known as Soudan during the French colonial period, took the name Mali on the suggestion of President Senghor of Senegal from the 14th century empire which covered much of what is today Senegal, Mali and part of Niger.(3)

Can a new Mali Federation of the two sections of the current Mali work better than the earlier Federation of Mali?  With good will and imagination, federalist structures should be able to be worked out. Yet there are times when good will and imagination are in short supply.

 

Rene Wadlow is the President and Chief Representative to the United Nations, Geneva of the Association of World Citizens.

Notes:

1) See the classic study: Germaine Dieterlen, Essai sur le religion Bambara (Paris,:Presses Universitaires de France,1951)

2) See: Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-speaking West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964)

William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965)

3) Raymond Mauny, Tableau géographique de l’Ouest africain au Moyen Age (Dakar: IFAN, 1961)

World Citizens Call for Protection of Timbuktu, UNESCO Cultural Heritage Site and Center of Trans-Saharan Cultural History

In Africa, Conflict Resolution, Current Events, Human Development, The Search for Peace, World Law on April 8, 2012 at 8:47 PM

WORLD CITIZENS CALL FOR PROTECTION OF TIMBUKTU,

UNESCO CULTURAL HERITAGE SITE

AND CENTER OF TRANS-SAHARAN CULTURAL HISTORY

 

By René Wadlow

 

In an April 8, 2012 Appeal to Irina Bokova, Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), René Wadlow, President of the Association of World Citizens (AWC), welcomed UNESCO’s speedy effort to prevent damage to Timbuktu and called for negotiations between the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and the Ansar Dine, a rival Tuareg group currently holding separate parts of the historic city.  The MNLA, led by its Secretary-General Bilal Ag Cherif, is the larger group and focuses on the creation of an independent state, Azawad, comprising northern Mali and possibly part of the Tuareg-inhabited area of northern Niger.

Ansar Dine, a smaller faction, is led by Ag Ghaley. It claims to want to create an Islamic state within all of Mali. Within or alongside Ansar Dine are Islamists from Algeria and Mauritania and probably other countries.  Some had been fighting in Libya and are heavily armed.  The aim of moving south toward non-Tuareg areas is, no doubt, unrealistic as Ansar Dine has no support in the more densely-populated south, inhabited by Bambara and Malenke ethnic groups. However, there could be an armed struggle for power between the MNLA and Ansar Dine in which the fragile, backed mud building of Timbuktu could be destroyed or badly damaged.

Timbuktu, a jewel of African culture and history, stands proud and tall in the desert sands of Mali.

While Timbuktu was once a metaphor for the middle of nowhere, it was an important city for the trans-Sahara trade from about 800 until 1591 when Moroccan troops destroyed the then Songhai Empire of Mali and Portugal and others developed a sea-going trade that largely replaced the trans-Sahara trade. (1). During the time that trade flourished, scholars and religious preachers were attracted to Timbuktu and Gao, the other trans-Sahara “port” and learning was highly developed.

The protection of Timbuktu’s cultural wealth may depend a good deal on the role of non-governmental organizations to facilitate negotiations between the MNLA the Ansar Dine and possible other armed groups. For the moment, the political situation in Mali is confused, and the protection of cultural sites in Timbuktu must not rank very high on the list of priorities.

From March 22 until April 6, 2012, a military group of young officers had taken control of government buildings in Bamako claiming that the government of President Amadou Touré was incompetent in the struggle against the Tuareg.  The coup was more or less led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, who had been trained by the United States (U. S.) Marine Corps, but Sanogo was probably acting on his own and not on behalf of the U. S. Marines.  The negative reaction to the coup was speedy.  Led by France, the former colonial power, the United Nations Security Council decided on April 4 to issue a President’s Statement (less strong than a resolution but on which all states must be in agreement) calling for a restoration of the civilian government.  It is not likely that the civilian-led government of President Touré will be restored.  Touré was himself a former general who had come to power in a coup, then governed in a fairly democratic way but without making many socio-economic advances.  The country now faces a food crisis due in part to drought and in part to the lack of improvements in the agricultural production and distribution system.

While the UN Security Council was meeting, the 15-member Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) also met, calling for a return to a civilian government and closing the frontiers.  During the ECOWAS meeting, it was decided to activate the Anti-Terrorism Centre which is located at Tamanarasset in south Algeria and to place some 2000 soldiers on alert. Captain Amadou Sanogo saw the “handwriting on the wall” and agreed to turn over the government to the President of the National Assembly who is the constitutional replacement when the President is absent.

President Amadou Touré of Mali (left) and his rival, Captain Amadou Sanogo of the Mali military (right).

The states in the UN Security Council and in ECOWAS refused to recognize the creation of the Tuareg state of Azawad, so it is unlikely that they will provide any mediators to negotiate between MNLA and Ansar Dime or to facilitate the protection of historic sites. There is on the part of many governments a dislike of carving up existing countries in order to create new states. It took fighting from 1982 to 2005 for there to be an agreement to create the new state of South Sudan and for other African states to agree to the division.

The military in Bamako do not seem organized or willing to die to retake northern Mali, especially since most of the Mali military are from the Bambara ethnic group with little attachment to northern Mali in any case.

Much of the initiative for the protection of educational and cultural institutions has come from the NGO world and world-mined artists. Early efforts were undertaken by Nicholas Roerich (1874-1947) a Russian and world citizen.  Nicholas Roerich had lived through the First World War and the Russian Revolution and saw how armed conflict can destroy works of art and cultural institutions.  For Roerich, such institutions were irreplaceable and their destruction was a loss for all humanity.  Thus, he worked for the protection of works of art and institutions of culture in times of armed conflict. He envisaged a universally-accepted symbol that could be placed on educational institutions in the way that a red cross had become a widely-recognized symbol to protect medical institutions and medical workers.  Roerich proposed a “Banner of Peace” — three red circles representing the past, present, and future — that could be placed upon institutions and sites of culture and education to protect them in times of conflict.

Roerich mobilized artists and intellectuals in the 1920s for the establishment of this Banner of Peace.  Henry A. Wallace, the US Secretary of Agriculture and later Vice-President was an admirer of Roerich and helped to have an official treaty introducing the Banner of Peace — the Roerich Peace Pact — signed at the White House on April 15, 1935 by 21 States in a Pan-American Union ceremony. At the signing, Henry Wallace on behalf of the USA said “At no time has such an ideal been more needed. It is high time for the idealists who make the reality of tomorrow, to rally around such a symbol of beauty, science, education which runs across all national boundaries to strengthen all that we hold dear in our particular governments and customs. Its acceptance signifies the approach of a time when those who truly love their own nation will appreciate in addition the unique contribution of other nations and also do reverence to that common spiritual enterprise which draws together in one fellowship all artists, scientists, educators and truly religious of whatever faith.”

Nicolas Roerich (1874-1947), the man who opened the drive to make protection of works of art a full-fledged part of the law of armed conflict.

After the Second World War, UNESCO has continued the effort, and there have been additional conventions on the protection of cultural and educational bodies in times of conflict.  The most important is the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The spirit of the Hague Convention is clear and the protection of cultural and educational institutions should be a priority in conflicts among States or in civil wars even if no State recognizes Azawad.

Therefore we, as World Citizens, all have a duty to articulate more clearly the crucial link among human rights standards, humanitarian law, and world law to protect educational and cultural institutions in times of conflict.  As Nicholas Roerich said in a presentation of his Pact “The world is striving toward peace in many ways, and everyone realizes in his heart that this constructive work is a true prophesy of the New Era.  We deplore the loss of libraries of Louvain and Oviedo and the irreplaceable beauty of the Cathedral of Rheims.  We remember the beautiful treasures of private collections which were lost during world calamities.  But we do not want to inscribe on these deeds any words of hatred. Let us simply say: Destroyed by human ignorance — rebuilt by human hope.

In 1914, a shell explosion at the Cathedral of Rheims in the early times of World War I.
Almost a century later, can the world possibly let Timbuktu become a "casualty of war" too?

 

René Wadlow is President and Chief Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva of the Association of World Citizens.

 

(1)   See  Raymond Mauny Tableau géographique de l’Ouest africain au Moyen Age (Dakar, IFAN, 1961, 587 pp.)

In English : Horace Miner, The primitive city of Timbuctoo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 297pp.)

The Horn of Africa: Refugees, Famine, Conflicts

In Africa, Conflict Resolution, Current Events, Solidarity, The Search for Peace, United Nations, World Law on July 31, 2011 at 11:24 PM

THE HORN OF AFRICA: REFUGEES, FAMINE, CONFLICTS

By René Wadlow

 

Only a crisis — actual or perceived — produces real change.  When the crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.  That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, and to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.

– Milton Friedman

 

Heavy fighting started again on July 28, 2011 in Mogadishu, the capital of what was once Somalia, in a battle between the African Union peacekeeping force (Amisom) and the Islamic insurgency al-Shahab. The fighting prevents aid from reaching the tens of thousands of refugees who have arrived in Mogadishu fleeing famine. The United Nations (UN) World Food Program says it cannot reach some two million people in need in areas controlled by al-Shahab which had expelled Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who were providing relief.

The Horn of Africa, in particular Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, faces a deep crisis, a combination of refugee flows, famine in part linked to drought, and persistent conflicts.  There is a broad consensus in the UN system that radical measures are needed to deal with the Horn of Africa crisis and that these measures will have to be taken in a holistic way with actions going from the local level of the individual farmer to the national level with new government policies, to measures to be undertaken by the African Union and the UN system, in particular the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome.

Combatants with Somalia's al-Shabab Islamist militia.

Today, cooperation is needed among the UN family of agencies, national governments, NGOs, and the millions of food producers. There is a need for swift, short-term measures to help people now suffering from lack of food, inadequate distribution and situations of violence. Such short-term action requires additional funding for the UN World Food Program and the release of national food stocks. However, it is the longer-range and structural issues on which world citizens have focused their attention. The world requires a World Food Policy and a clear Plan of Action.

While constant improvements in technology, mechanization, plant breeding and farm chemicals have steadily increased food production per acre in much of the world, African food production per acre has stagnated, and in some areas has gone down. Likewise, the portion of development assistance in Africa dedicated to agriculture has declined from 15 per cent in the 1980s to 4 per cent in 2006.

As a July 11, 2011 UNCTAD study Economic Development in Africa stresses “One of the major challenges which African countries currently face is to generate productive jobs and livelihoods for the 7-10 million young people entering the labor force each year. This is difficult to achieve simply through commodity exports but rather requires a complementary process of agricultural productivity growth and development of non-agricultural employment opportunities in both industry and services.”

Carcasses of dead sheep and goats in the drought-stricken region of Waridaad, Somaliland.

Thus, the first need in Africa is to develop the local economies: currently, poverty, lack of adapted technology, population pressure on ecologically fragile areas, a growth of urban slums due to rapid rural to urban migration is the lot of many Sub-Saharan African countries.

Increased action to improve rural life needs to be taken quickly.  As the recent UN-sponsored Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warns “Human activity is putting such strains on the natural function of Earth that the ability of the planet’s ecosystem to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for granted. It is becoming ever more apparent that human society has a rapidly shrinking window of opportunity to alter its path.”

The Horn of Africa is an extreme case. The Horn possesses all the resources needed to make it one of Africa’s major economic centers, and yet there seems to be no halting the environmental decay and political insecurity it engenders. In fact, when one looks at the Horn’s problems, one must conclude that urgent and well-directed international action is needed to prevent a mega-disaster. Due to an often unenlightened management of the environment, its willful mismanagement to extract short-term economic gain, and confrontational rather than conciliatory policies, the squandering of the region’s resources has gathered speed.

A map of the ongoing famine in the Horn of Africa. The facts speak for themselves.

Environmental degradation is part of a cycle that upsets the traditional balance between people, their habitat and the socio-economic systems by which they live. Insecurity leads to strife; strife results in inter-clan feuding, civil war, cross-border raiding and military confrontation. Environmental degradation and insecurity continue to interact, swinging back and forth like a pendulum of destruction. A shrinking resource base breeds insecurity; insecurity spreads conflict, and conflict causes environmental destruction.

It is hard to know how to improve the situation. There is a long-term need for people to modify their living patterns to bring about a better quality of life, with increased security.  There is a need to break the cycle of chaos so that people can transform insecurity into confidence. Yet social change is slow, and the necessary limiting of the birth rate can take generations. Agricultural patterns also change slowly. There is no political leadership within the area, and there is no cooperation among the states of the Horn. The African Union’s conflict management structures do not function, and the UN has hoped that the African Union could take the lead in the area’s conflict resolution. This was a hope based on an unwillingness to get involved rather than a realistic evaluation of the situation.

The cycle of chaos is likely to speed up, and more refugees will be on the move.  However, as Milton Friedman noted only a crisis produces real change. Just as the “Arab Spring” brought a new generation of leadership into action — though not yet into power — the Horn of Africa might see a new generation of non-governmental leadership coming to the fore. The older political and clanic leadership has failed and is discredited. However, they have guns and plan to stay in control. Yet what is politically impossible today in the Horn may become politically inevitable.

 

René Wadlow is Senior Vice President and Chief Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva of the Association of World Citizens.

See also Somalia: Signs of Danger (https://awcungeneva.wordpress.com/2011/05/17/somalia-signs-of-danger/)

Will the UN be a Fairy Godmother for the Birth of South Sudan?

In Africa, Current Events, United Nations, World Law on July 9, 2011 at 9:46 PM

WILL THE UN BE A FAIRY GODMOTHER FOR THE BIRTH OF SOUTH SUDAN?

By René Wadlow

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan became an independent State, six months after the January referendum in which the south Sudan population voted overwhelmingly for independence. However, Sudan is not really structured to be divided in two. There are no natural dividing lines, neither physical nor social. During much of the English colonial period, southern Sudan was administered from Uganda as road communications were easier than from Khartoum, the capital in the north of the country. In fact, ‘administered’ is too strong a term. South Sudan had no real crops for export or minerals to mine, and so there was very little administration. In place of any government development activities, the Colonial Office encouraged Christian missionaries, mostly Church of England and Roman Catholic to set up schools and clinics. Thus south Sudan was ‘Christianized’ in that the educated had gone to church schools and been treated in Christian clinics. However, most people continued also to practice traditional rituals as these were considered as part of tribal life and not as the rituals of a particular religion. Thus when considering Sudan, the often-used terms of ‘Muslim’, ‘Christian’, and ‘Animist’ cover a more complex reality.

In December 2010, no less than 98.83% of South Sudanese voters chose independence at the polls.

Complexity is a term which is true for all Sudanese life — political, economic, and geographic. The failure to deal creatively with complexity has led to fighting for nearly all of its history as an independent State since 1956. On the eve of Independence, with the makeup of a new national army being the spark which set the fire, civil war broke out, basically on a North-South basis. There have been two phases to the Sudan Civil War. The first phase (1954-1972) had ended with negotiations facilitated by the All-African Conference of Churches with back up help from the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

The 1972-1982 decade was one of relative peace, but it was not used to heal the divisions or to work out forms of government, administration, and legal systems that would be acceptable to all segments of Sudanese society. International attention on Sudan had diminished once the 1972 peace agreement was signed. The warning signals that all was not well were ignored internationally. Thus in 1982, southern soldiers who had been integrated into the national army revolted, and the second phase of the civil war continued from 1983 until the end of 2004.

As a North-South peace agreement was nearly set, groups in Darfur, western Sudan, who had not been part of the North-South conflict decided that violence was the only way to get attention and to get a ‘piece of the pie’ of the natural resources, especially the oil revenue. They hoped for a short war after which they would be invited to participate in the North-South negotiations. In practice, the Darfur conflict has not been short — starting in 2003 and continuing still today, and the Darfur factions have not been invited to the North-South negotiations.

The flag of the Republic of South Sudan, originally the flag of the Sudanese People's Army/Movement (SPLAM).

Darfur (the home of the Fur) was always marginal to the politics of modern Sudan. In the 19th century, Darfur, about the size of France, was an independent Sultanate loosely related to the Ottoman Empire. It was on a major trade route from West Africa to Egypt and so populations from what is now northern Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Chad joined the older ethnic groups of the area: the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa and the Birgit. Nomads from Libya also moved south into Darfur. As the population density was low, a style of life with mutual interaction between pastoral herdsmen and settled agriculturalists with some livestock developed. Increasingly, however, there was ever-greater competition for water and forage made scarce by environmental degradation and the spread of the desert.

France and England left Darfur as a buffer zone between the French colonial holdings — what is now Chad — and the Anglo-Egyptian controlled Sudan. French-English rivalry in West Africa had nearly led earlier to a war — the Fashoda crisis of 1898. Thus a desert buffer was of more use than its low agricultural and livestock production would provide to either European colonial power. It was only in 1916 during the First World War when French-English colonial rivalry in Africa paled in front of the common German enemy that the English annexed Darfur to the Sudan without asking anyone in Darfur or the Sudan if such a ‘marriage’ was desirable.

Darfur continued its existence as an environmentally fragile area of Sudan. It was marginal in economics but largely self-sufficient. Once Sudan was granted its independence in 1956, Darfur became politically as well as economically marginal. Darfur’s people have received less education, less health care, less development assistance and fewer government posts than any other region.

The seal of the government of the new sovereign nation.

In 2000, Darfur’s political leadership had met and wrote the Black Book which detailed the region’s systematic under-representation in national government since independence. However, at the level of the central government, the Black Book led to no steps to increase the political and economic position of Darfur. This lack of reaction convinced some in Darfur that only violent action would bring recognition and compromise as the war with the South had done.

An armed insurgency began in 2003 led by the more secular but tribal Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Islamist-leaning Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Since then, there have been splits in the JEM and the SLA largely along tribal lines. These splits make negotiations with the government of Sudan all the more difficult. The interests of many people in Darfur are not represented by either the government or the insurgencies, but it is nearly impossible for other voices to be heard.

In Darfur, there is a joint African Union-UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMID), but there is no peace to keep. Although the peacekeeping force has a mission to protect populations, it is unable to do so. As Mohammed Otham noted in his UN report (A/HRC/14/41) “In Darfur, notwithstanding the general improvement in the security situation, banditry, criminal activities and intermittent military activities by the parties to the conflict have continued. In some areas, aerial bombardment and troop mobilization by the Sudanese Armed Forces have been reported. In the context of this ongoing violence, United Nations and humanitarian personnel face significant risks to their lives. A significant number of UNAMID and humanitarian staff were deliberately attacked; some were abducted and held in captivity for long periods.” The level of suffering in Darfur — people killed and displaced, the agricultural infrastructure destroyed — has been very high. The reconciliation and reconstruction of Darfur will be difficult. We must be on the lookout for possibilities to help.

This is what the new country will look like in political and administrative terms. The AWC wishes South Sudan well and looks forward to working with its government toward the protection and promotion of world law.

The UN has had Special Representatives in Darfur responsible for facilitating negotiations, but they have made little progress. Darfur will continue as part of North Sudan and should be a priority of concern.

As there are no sharp natural or cultural dividing lines between North and South Sudan, there will be non-Muslim populations left in the North and Muslim populations in the South. We must hope that there will not be the massive transfer of populations as at the independence of India and Pakistan. There are possibilities of continued conflict in the northern non-Muslim areas such as the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan provinces. There is also a mixed population on the frontier between North and South in Abyei. It is less the fact that the population is mixed than that the area is oil-rich that has attracted international attention. The UN Security Council in resolution 1990 of 29 June 2011 decided to establish the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).

Thus, the United Nations is present as the Fairy Godmother at the birth of South Sudan. As in the folk tales, the Fairy Godmother has some presents for the newly born as well as certain conditions and demands. The UN brings few material goods, and peacekeeping forces have been largely unable to bring peace. However, the UN has brought the present of world attention, a willingness to help and high international standards to meet. We will have to watch closely as the newborn grows.

René Wadlow is Senior Vice President and Chief Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva of the Association of World Citizens.

Syria: Reforms and Mediation

In Current Events, Democracy, Human Rights, Middle East & North Africa, World Law on July 3, 2011 at 6:49 PM

SYRIA: REFORMS AND MEDIATION

By René Wadlow

Hope has never trickled down. It has always sprung up.

Studs Terkel

The situation in Syria seems to have reached a critical turning point. There is a possibility that popular protests continue as they have since mid-March and that they continue to be met by military and police violence in violation of the spirit and letter of humanitarian international law. The Syrian army and militias have responded to unarmed nonviolent demonstrations with disproportionate force. Humanitarian international law has as its base the Martens Clause named after the legal advisor of the Russian Czar at the time of the Hague Peace Conferences. The clause is included in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention. It is taken up again in Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. The Martens Clause states that “the means that can be used to injure an enemy are not unlimited” but must meet the test of ‘proportionality’ meaning that every resort to armed force be limited to what is necessary for meeting military objectives. The shooting of unarmed demonstrators does not meet the test of proportionality.

For several months, the Syrian people have been sending a clear message to President Bashar al-Assad: The time has come for him to step aside.

However, there seems to be a real possibility of negotiations between the government led by President Bashar al-Assad and members of different opposition groups. President Assad, after two months of silence during which time demonstrations spread and repression increased on June 20 has called for a “national dialog” that could usher in changes. However, there were few specifics as to what topics such a national dialog would cover.

Many opposition leaders consider the proposal as a bid for more time during which arrests continue and over 1,000 persons have been killed in response to non-violent demonstrations. Moreover, it is not clear that the leaders of the longstanding but divided leadership of opposition groups are in control of the demonstrators. As in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrian demonstrators are young, come from an increasingly educated middle class and are influenced by the spirit of the ‘Arab Spring’ rather than by the ideology of the historic opposition groups.

As a sign that the proposal for a national dialog was real, the government allowed a meeting on June 27 in Damascus of some opposition figures. Those who met stressed that they did not claim to speak for all the demonstrators, and not all open opposition figures attended. In addition there are opposition figures in exile, and those in hiding fearful of arrest. There are also, no doubt, those who are waiting to see which way the wind blows. President Assad has spoken of starting the national dialog on July 12, but it is not clear who will attend and how representative they will be.

The savagery of the Damascus regime in suppressing dissent knows no boundaries. President Assad will resort even to heavy military force to silence his own people.

Civil society participation — religious, education, labor, women, cultural and media — is crucial to build public support for a real national dialog and to broaden constituencies for peace. A national dialog is merely the beginning of a deep reordering of the political and economic structures and relationships among elements of the society. There is a need for continual adjustments to adapt to new developments. There also needs to be quick post-agreement benefits to give people a stake in the readjustment process and to reduce the capacity of spoilers.

In some conflict situations, external mediators from the United Nations, national governments or nongovernmental organizations have played a useful role. Currently, the situation seems to have reached a stalemate when neither the government nor the protesters can resolve the crisis on their own terms. There are few signs that the government is open to external mediators, but with refugees from Syria going to Turkey, there is a real danger that the conflict will take on trans-frontier dimensions. A real national dialog could set out a framework for reforms which have been promised in the past but which never came to birth. As a result, sentiments have hardened, and trust has been lost. As external but concerned parties, we should encourage a broadly-based national dialog as a first important step on the road to reform.

René Wadlow is Senior Vice President and Chief Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva of the Association of World Citizens.

Palestinian Status at the UN: Breaking the Logjam

In Conflict Resolution, Current Events, Middle East & North Africa, The Search for Peace, United Nations on June 30, 2011 at 7:44 PM

PALESTINIAN STATUS AT THE UN: BREAKING THE LOGJAM

By René Wadlow

There is a good deal of discussion in the halls of the United Nations (UN), both in New York and Geneva, concerning a possible application of full membership in the UN by the Palestinian Authority. The discussions reflect similar discussions within Foreign Ministries in the hope that there can be an agreed-upon program of action (or non-action) by September when the new General Assembly meets. Currently Palestine has observer status at the UN from a time when liberation movements were given observer status — two organizations for South Africa, one for South West Africa as Namibia was then, and for the PLO. With the changes in South Africa and Namibia, the liberation movement observer status was dropped for the three, and only the PLO remained.

In practice, there is little effective difference between observer status and full membership. Observers cannot vote, but voting in the UN has been largely replaced by ‘consensus making’. Effectiveness for all countries except for a small number of Great Powers depends on the skills of the diplomats which represent them. The Vatican has only observer status but a good deal of influence due to an effective diplomatic team. The Palestinian diplomats in Geneva have been weak, in New York somewhat stronger. The Palestinian diplomats have always been in the shadows of the representatives of the Arab States who want to play ‘Big Brother’, but with the exception of Egypt which has always had a strong core of diplomats, the Arab diplomats have rarely been more competent than the Palestinians.

Being overshadowed by the larger Arab States would probably not change even if full membership is granted, but full membership would be a symbolic victory of legitimacy and open the door to the independent use of the World Court. As Mahmoud Abbas has written “Palestine’s admission to the United Nations would pave the way for the internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not only a political one. It would also pave the way for us to pursue claims against Israel at the United Nations, human rights treaty bodies and the International Court of Justice.”

The Middle East came this close to peace when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993.

As of now, there are a number of variations being discussed around three possible approaches:

1)      The first approach favored by the USA, some of the Western European members of the European Union, in particular Germany, and a few others including Israel is that the issue should go away. It is felt that there are enough problems in the world, especially in the Middle East not to have a complicated procedural battle in September. This has been the ‘advice’ given to the Palestinians by the US, Canada, and some Western European States. It may be also what some of the Arab States are saying more privately. To reinforce their arguments, the US and the Western European governments have a strong card — they can cut off funding to the Palestinian Authority. The pretext would be the Hamas support or participation in a ‘unity government’ even if such a government is made of ‘non-political technocrats’. Hamas is still listed by the USA and the European Union as a ‘terrorist organization’ and so cannot receive funds from the US or EU governments. The Palestinian Authority depends largely on external financing; thus cutting off financing is an argument that carries weight — even if it is called ‘blackmail’ in other settings.

In exchange for dropping the full membership application, there would be some sort of short Israel-Palestine meeting where each side would speak of a ‘peace process’ through September when the membership issue has gone by. Such a sleight of hand will not advance real negotiations but may ‘buy time’ which is what many governments now want.

2)      There is, however, a real possibility that the Palestinian Authority will ask for full membership in September. This will depend in part on discussions among the Palestinian leadership and the views of the three key States concerning the Middle East: Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. Iran which is one of the Vice Presidents of the upcoming General Assembly will be particularly influential in procedural matters. The UN Charter states that the admission of new members “will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council”. The Council makes its membership recommendation through a resolution; thus it must be approved by at least nine of the Council’s 15 members and not be vetoed by the one of the five permanent members. If the USA abstains — abstentions are not considered a veto — it is likely that there would be at least nine positive votes for Palestinian membership in the Security Council. Then it is most likely that the General Assembly would follow the Security Council recommendation as it has always done in the past. Thus current discussions turn around what could convince the US to abstain rather than veto. We will return to this key issue after a consideration of a third possibility.

3)      The third possibility in the case of a US veto is to move the issue to the General Assembly under what is known now as the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism. UN General Assembly resolution 377(V) of November 3, 1950, first known as ‘the Acheson Plan’ from the name of the US Secretary of State who proposed it and later renamed Uniting for Peace states that in cases where the UN Security Council fails to act to maintain international peace and security, owing to disagreement among the five permanent members, the matter shall be discussed immediately by the General Assembly. If the General Assembly is not in session, an Emergency Special Session can be called. This procedure has been used 10 times since its 1950 start. (1) As from September to December, the General Assembly will be in session, a Special Session will not have to be called. For a resolution to pass under the Uniting for Peace mechanism, there must be a 2/3 majority, meaning now 135 States if all are present and voting. However, not being present is a ‘diplomatic’ way of not having to be seen making a choice. Currently, 112 UN members recognize a Palestinian State within the pre-1967 frontiers. What cannot be analyzed is how hard the USA and some of its allies would work to prevent the 135 positive voters.

To turn back to the Security Council procedure, we can ask could there be a ‘deal’ that would satisfy no one completely but not dissatisfy any of the five permanent powers to the extent of their casting a veto. Here we can turn to precedent because at the UN everything functions by precedent. If something has been done once, one can argue that it can be done again. If it has never been done, it takes an exceptional situation and a few highly skilled diplomats to get any innovation.

A picture of the funeral of Yitzhak Rabin after he was shot dead on November 4, 1995 by an Israeli nationalist named Yigal Amir.

Thus we can turn to the 1954 period and the breaking of the ‘logjam’ on membership. During the first ‘hot round’ of the Cold War — the June 1950 to July 1953 Korean War — the Soviet Union and the USA blocked each other’s potential allies from UN membership. At the end of the Korean War, there was a host of pending membership applications on which no progress had been made. There seemed to be little possibility of moving things forward.

The 1954 membership issue was my start at looking closely at diplomatic negotiations around procedural issues at the UN. At a time when I should have spent my time chasing girls, I was a university student representative on the Executive Committee of what was then the United World Federalists in the USA. In 1955, the issue of a review conference on the UN Charter was to be placed automatically on the agenda of the General Assembly. During the 1945 negotiations that led to the creation of the UN Charter, a review conference on the Charter after 10 years was to be placed on the agenda. This was a demand of some of the smaller States at San Francisco, in particular Australia. It was expected in 1945 that such a review conference would be held and that was still the expectation in the period 1953-1954. There was a good deal of reflection on how to improve and strengthen the Charter during such a Review Conference. Universal membership was one of the demands of UN reformers, both some diplomats and activists such as those in the United World Federalists who had taken a lead on the Charter Review issue.

However, both the USA and the USSR opposed holding a Charter Review conference and brought most of their allies along with them. The result was that when the Charter Review conference came upon on the agenda, it was swept under the rug, and there has never been a review. Nevertheless, the diplomats of the USA and the USSR felt that some of the ‘steam’ for a Review Conference had to be lowered and this could be done by getting rid of ‘universal membership’ as an issue. Negotiations to break the logjam on pending applications started with the aim of making as close-to-possible balance between pro-USA, pro-USSR and neutral States entering the UN. The negotiations were carried out in 1954 and in 1955, before the debate on Charter Review, the membership logjam broke and Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sri Lanka entered the UN. Japan should have been part of the group, but there was still the “enemy states” clause in the Charter which took more negotiations concerning Japan. Japan only came in the next year, 1956.

Dean Acheson, the U. S. Secretary of State who fathered the Uniting for Peace procedure at the United Nations.

Can there be something comparable in September? In an article “Coming in from the Cold: UN Membership Needed for the Phantom Republics”, I suggested at the time of the Georgia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia conflict that Abkhazia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistra be given UN membership as a necessary first step for security and a lessening of tensions. I had stressed that “to find mutually acceptable forms of government in these conflicts will require political creativity (breaking out of thinking in fixed patterns) and then new forms of constitutional order such as renewed forms of federal-confederal types of government, greater popular participation in decision-making and new forms of protection of minorities. Flexibility, compromise and cooperation are the hallmarks of success when it comes to resolving such conflicts concerning independence and autonomy. There is a need for a healing of past animosities and a growth of wider loyalties and cooperation.”

Both diplomats and members of the UN secretariat as well as secretariat of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe where I had also floated the idea explained in detail why such a joint membership procedure would not happen. None the less, if we added upgrading the status of Palestine in the UN, another membership logjam might be broken. The point I have repeatedly made is that membership does not solve difficulties; it just provides a framework where serious negotiations might be carried out. The 1955 access to membership of Cambodia and Laos did not ‘solve’ the Indochina conflict. The French-led war in Vietnam was still going on, to be followed a decade later by the US-led war.

Thus, I think that a world citizen position is that full Palestinian membership in the UN will not ‘solve’ all the Israel-Palestine issues, and certainly not the issues of the wider Middle East. However UN membership will allow the Palestinians to come out from the shadows of the Arab States and to negotiate with the Israelis as equals. Such is a very modest step forward but it is worth taking.

(1)   For a useful discussion of the background to the Uniting for Peace procedure see Dean Acheson Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969, chapters 47-51)

 

René Wadlow is Senior Vice President and Chief Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva of the Association of World Citizens.

Femmes en Arabie Saoudite: Quand Dieu punit la moitié du ciel

In Current Events, Human Rights, Middle East & North Africa, Women's Rights, World Law on June 9, 2011 at 7:58 PM

FEMMES EN ARABIE SAOUDITE:

QUAND DIEU PUNIT LA MOITIE DU CIEL

Par Bernard Henry

 

Le 31 mai et le 1er juin derniers, à travers deux appels signés par son Officier de Presse, le Bureau de Représentation auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève de l’Association of World Citizens (AWC) a interpellé le gouvernement d’Arabie Saoudite au sujet des droits des femmes, que la monarchie saoudienne n’a jamais vraiment reconnus et dont l’absence devient de plus en plus pénalisante pour les femmes du pays.

Et pour cause – contrairement à la plupart des pays du monde, du moins ceux où il existe une religion officielle, a fortiori quand il s’agit de l’Islam, le « royaume wahhabite », ainsi nommé parce qu’il consacre la doctrine de l’Islam développée au dix-huitième siècle par Mohammed ibn Abd el-Wahhâb, lequel souhaitait ramener l’Islam à sa « pureté d’origine » et rejetait du fait toute tradition extérieure au Coran, considère son territoire tout entier comme une mosquée, prohibant en conséquence tout autre culte que le culte musulman, et encore, tel que le conçoit l’Etat saoudien uniquement.

En règle générale, l’Islam sunnite se désolidarise du wahhabisme qu’il estime sectaire et extrémiste. Ainsi des Talibans d’Afghanistan, dont l’ « Emirat islamique » ne fut reconnu que par trois pays au monde – les Emirats Arabes Unis, le Pakistan et, bien sûr, l’Arabie Saoudite, qui s’était retrouvée à ce sujet en confrontation directe avec l’Iran de Mohammed Khatami, l’Iran chiite pour lequel les Talibans étaient des « fossiles » du sunnisme.

Une minorité chiite existe toutefois en Arabie Saoudite, et parfois, comme ici, des heurts ont lieu avec la majorité wahhabite qui tolère mal l'existence sur le sol saoudien d'une communauté religieuse, même musulmane, autre que la sienne.

Que l’on n’aille pas y voir pour autant une quelconque intention de l’AWC de s’acharner contre l’Arabie Saoudite en particulier. Les droits des femmes sont l’un des sujets qui sont pour nous les plus importants en matière de Droits de l’Homme, et nous avons interpellé dans ce cadre les gouvernements de pays aussi éloignés les uns des autres, tant géographiquement que culturellement, que le Canada, le Paraguay, l’Afrique du Sud, la Guinée-Conakry, la Belgique, l’Afghanistan, l’Australie et bien d’autres encore. Mais force est de constater qu’un système saoudien bien particulier, mêlant droit et religion – et encore, religion prise dans un sens outrageusement littéral et rétrograde – ne favorise guère le changement, celui que l’on doit pourtant bien entreprendre sitôt que l’on réalise le caractère essentiel du respect des droits des femmes si l’on veut que le pays que l’on dirige puisse connaître et la paix civile et le progrès social, l’un comme l’autre étant impossibles quand les femmes sont tenues en état d’infériorité, une infériorité qui atteint aujourd’hui les confins de l’absurde et devient du fait, pour les Saoudiennes, un poids de plus en plus lourd à porter.

La première question que nous avons donc soulevée auprès des autorités saoudiennes est celle de la tutelle masculine.

Celle-ci s’applique aux femmes saoudiennes quel que soit leur âge, mais les plus touchées sont indéniablement les jeunes femmes, car elles ne peuvent prétendre étudier sans l’accord préalable d’un tuteur masculin reconnu par la loi. Par ce système, une jeune femme peut être privée d’études à tous les niveaux, y compris dans le supérieur, et si elle ne l’est pas, elle ne peut choisir sa discipline universitaire sans l’accord de son tuteur. Quand bien même il lui est généreusement accordé d’aller à l’université, des restrictions de mouvement lui sont imposées lorsqu’elle s’y trouve, des restrictions qui font que, même en cas de maladie, elle ne peut quitter les lieux. Et s’il n’y avait que les étudiantes à être visées …  Même les enseignantes, pendant les heures de cours, sont soumises à la séquestration, leurs élèves (féminines) ne pouvant elles-mêmes sortir que si un tuteur masculin ou un conducteur désigné est venu les chercher.

Une femme en Arabie Saoudite doit constamment porter le voile, ainsi qu'une longue robe noire couvrante dénommée l'abaya.

Et de toute façon, avant de rentrer chez elles, qu’ont-elles bien pu étudier ? Ce à quoi leur tuteur masculin a consenti, certes. Mais pas l’ingénierie, l’architecture ou les sciences politiques, car dans le système saoudien, qui n’est pas mixte, aucun programme universitaire public n’existe dans ces domaines pour les femmes, tous les autres n’étant offerts que dans une qualité, et en quantité, inférieure à celle dont profitent leurs homologues mâles. Cela touche tant les infrastructures, les cours étant proposés dans des bâtiments délabrés, que les équipements pédagogiques, les bibliothèques réservées aux femmes étant sous-équipées et les bibliothèques mixtes ne leur étant que d’un accès limité. Certaines universités saoudiennes vont jusqu’à ne pas s’embarrasser de telles contingences en n’admettant pas du tout les femmes dans leurs effectifs.

Alors, bien sûr, certaines envisageront d’aller étudier à l’étranger – mais alors, il faudra vraiment que leurs parents en aient les moyens. Pour celles qui devront d’abord obtenir une bourse gouvernementale, le Ministère de l’Education exigera qu’un tuteur masculin signe un formulaire d’autorisation puis accompagne l’intéressée sur place, après quoi celle-ci devra se soumettre à un suivi régulier par l’attaché culturel de l’ambassade saoudienne de sa tutelle masculine, et au moindre écart, c’est la révocation de la bourse et le retour direct en Arabie Saoudite.

Les instances des Nations Unies en charge des droits des femmes en ont déjà maintes fois fait grief à Riyad qui, pour l’instant, a toujours fait la sourde oreille. Nous l’avons nous-mêmes rappelé au Roi Abdullah, dont nous verrons bien ce qu’il en fait. Mais déjà, pour éviter que, comme toujours depuis l’an dernier, nos lettres ne nous reviennent non ouvertes car refusées par la Cour royale et les ministères saoudiens, cette fois, nous avons tout envoyé par fax …

Il n'est toutefois pas rare de voir des femmes en voile intégral ...

Il en est de même pour la seconde question que nous avons abordée, celle-là étant vraiment une question d’actualité, au sens fort du terme.

Le 22 mai dernier, une Saoudienne du nom de Manal Al-Sharif a été arrêtée au volant d’une voiture à 4H du matin, puis remise en liberté sous caution avant que la police ne revienne l’arrêter à minuit le lendemain, cette fois à son domicile. De quoi Manal Al-Sharif s’était-elle rendue coupable au volant ? D’un excès de vitesse ? De conduite en état d’ivresse ? Quel délit routier grave avait-elle bien pu commettre pour se trouver à ce point dans le collimateur des autorités ? Tout simple. Manal était au volant, à savoir qu’elle conduisait une voiture, et ça, pour une femme en Arabie Saoudite, c’est un délit. Ou plus exactement, c’est contraire à la religion …

Mais comment, me direz-vous, peut-il exister des préceptes religieux musulmans concernant la conduite automobile puisque, lorsque l’Islam est apparu au 7ème siècle, l’automobile était loin d’exister ? Ca n’a pas gêné un imam saoudien, qui a cru bon de préciser en 1990 – au demeurant année de l’arrivée massive de troupes occidentales en Arabie Saoudite suite à l’invasion du Koweït par l’Irak de Saddam Hussein, et avec lesdites troupes de femmes soldats – que selon lui, Dieu considérait qu’une femme qui conduit une voiture était une pécheresse, rien que ça.

Dans sa fatwa, édit religieux qui n’a en théorie aucune valeur juridique, mais c’est sans compter sur l’omniprésence intrusive de la doctrine wahhabite dans le droit saoudien, le Cheikh Abdel Aziz Bin Abdallah Bin Baz nous explique ainsi, à peine immodeste, ce que le dieu de l’Islam aurait dit à Mahomet si les voitures avaient existé lorsque le Coran fut révélé à ce dernier:

« […] La question de la conduite des automobiles par les femmes. Il est connu que ceci constitue une source d’indéniables vices, inter alia, la khilwa [rencontre en privé entre un homme et une femme] interdite par la loi et l’abandon du hijab. Cela concerne aussi les rencontres entre des femmes et des hommes sans que les précautions nécessaires soient prises. Cela pourrait aussi conduire à des actes haraam [impies] et c’est pourquoi ce fut interdit. La pure Chari’a interdit également les moyens qui conduisent à la commission d’actes de nature impie et considère de tels actes haraam en eux-mêmes …  Ainsi, la pure Chari’a a proscrit toutes les voies menant au vice …  La conduite automobile féminine est l’un des moyens qui mènent à cela et c’est en soi une évidence. »

Le système judiciaire saoudien ignore totalement les Droits de l'Homme. Ici, une sentence de flagellation est exécutée en public.

Le problème, c’est que, d’une part, notre imam ne nous explique en rien le lien entre ces délires et la Chari’a qu’il invoque, ni a fortiori avec le Coran, et que, d’autre part, aucun pays musulman au monde n’a repris cette interprétation arriérée et fantasmatique des textes saints, l’Arabie Saoudite étant le seul pays au monde, toutes traditions juridiques confondues, où les femmes n’aient pas le droit de conduire une voiture.

Là encore, l’ONU a donné de la voix. Le Comité sur l’Elimination de la Discrimination contre les Femmes et le Groupe de Travail du Conseil des Droits de l’Homme pour la Revue périodique universelle ont appelé à l’unisson le royaume wahhabite à mettre fin à cette pratique, jusqu’ici à nul effet pourtant. Quant à Manal Al-Sharif, elle fut finalement libérée le 30 mai …  Mais ne peut toujours pas conduire un véhicule, ni elle ni quelque Saoudienne que ce soit.

Reste à voir maintenant si le Ministre saoudien de la Justice écoutera plus volontiers l’AWC que les instances des Nations Unies, sachant que nos fax lui sont bien parvenus et espérant qu’il n’a pas donné ordre à son personnel de jeter tout de suite tout envoi portant notre emblème, à défaut de pouvoir le refuser comme une lettre.

Après sa libération, Manal Al-Sharif retrouve son fils. Son acte de bravoure a suscité l'admiration de par le monde et chez de nombreuses Saoudiennes qui s'identifient à sa cause.

Dans leur bestseller de 2010, La moitié du ciel (en anglais, Half the Sky), Nicholas Kristof et Sheryl Wudunn, grands reporters au New York Times, lauréats du Prix Pulitzer, nous parlent des fléaux qui s’abattent sur les femmes de par le monde, tels que l’esclavage sexuel, les « crimes d’honneur », les mutilations génitales et les viols. « La moitié du ciel », c’est ce que représentent selon eux les femmes, qui constituent certes, ici sur la Terre, la moitié la plus importante de l’humanité, ne serait-ce qu’en termes purement numéraires.

Or, en regardant cette Arabie Saoudite où l’homme, non tant ici l’être humain que l’individu mâle, interprète la parole de Dieu comme étant de nature uniquement punitive, le fait de naître femme étant en lui-même une offense, l’on ne peut s’empêcher de se demander si l’on n’est pas sur une terre où, pour sainte que la veuille le « Gardien des Deux Saintes Mosquées » qu’est le Roi d’Arabie Saoudite, à tout instant et en tout lieu, Dieu punit la moitié du ciel …

Que c’est avoir mal, ou trop peu, lu le Coran que de faire ainsi. Lorsque l’Arabie Saoudite soutenait l’insensé régime taliban d’Afghanistan, même les Emirats Arabes Unis et le Pakistan qui faisaient de même n’en exigeaient pas tant de leurs ressortissantes. C’est dire.

Que l’Arabie Saoudite se considère tout entière comme une mosquée, cela ne concerne pas l’AWC, trop attachée pour y trouver à redire au droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes. Que l’Etat saoudien en prenne prétexte pour violer les droits fondamentaux de son peuple, là, en revanche, nous ne pouvons l’admettre. Et a fortiori, qu’il invoque la parole divine pour opprimer les femmes¸ autant le peuple saoudien ne sera jamais notre ennemi, autant, de ce seul fait, son gouvernement peut être assuré quant à lui que, tant qu’il continuera de le faire ou de le laisser faire, il ne sera jamais notre ami. Et sachant quelle bonne écoute nous est accordée au sein de l’ONU, c’est bien dommage pour lui.

 

Bernard Henry est Officier de Presse du Bureau de Représentation auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève de l’Association of World Citizens.